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TUTTLE V. ARLINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL BD.,

195 F.3D 698 (4TH CIR. 1999)
FACTS

Grace Tuttle ("Tuttle") and Rachel Sechler ("Sechler"), two non-minority
preschool applicants, applied for admission to the Arlington Traditional
School ("ATS") and, based on the results of a weighted admissions lottery,
were not admitted.' As non-minority applicants, their probabilities of random
selection in the lottery diminished because applicants from under-represented
groups had an increased probability of selection.2 In response to prior
litigation, the district court had enjoined the Arlington County School Board
("School Board") from using a school admissions policy based on diversity,
and it ordered the Board to use a weighted lottery system in determining
admission.' The Arlington Traditional School is an oversubscribed public
school that created its weighted admissions lottery to promote racial, ethnic,
and socioeconomic diversity in its student body, rather than to remedy past
discrimination.4 The Applicants filed suit against the School Board to enjoin
it permanently from implementing its race conscious admissions Policy
("policy").'
ATS is an alternative kindergarten where admission is based solely upon
availability.6 The school's admission policy has two goals: (1) "To prepare...
students to live in a diverse, global society" and (2) to help the School Board
"serve the diverse groups of students in the district...."7 Through this policy,
ATS sought to obtain a student body "in proportions that approximate the
distribution of students from those groups in the district's overall student
1. Tuttle v. Arlington County School Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 702 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. Tuttle, 195 F.3d 698, 702.
3. Id. at 701, 702. This policy used a weighted lottery system in which each applicant's lottery
weight was calculated as the product of the individual weights for the following three factors, the
applicant's: 1) economic or family background, 2) first language, and 3) racial or ethnic group. See table
in original for the relative weights utilized in the lottery for each of the three separate factors. The Policy
was created in response to prior litigation in Tito v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7932. In Tito, the district court permanently enjoined ATS from implementing its admissions policy and
ordered the School Board to make invitations for admissions as long as it employed a random lottery
procedure. The plaintiff in Tito submitted a proposed Order Granting Declaratory Relief and Permanent
Injunction containing a provision that permanently restrained and enjoined the Board from using race, color
and ethnicity as a factor in offering invitations for admission to ATS. Instead of appealing the Tito decision,
the School Board adopted a new policy.
4. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 700.
5. Id. at 700. The Applicants filed suit under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201,2202 and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981,
1983.
6. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 701.
7. Id. The Policy also defined diversity using three equally weighted factors: (I) whether the
applicant was from a low-income or special family background, (2) whether English was the applicant's first
or second language, and (3) the racial or ethnic group to which the applicant belonged.
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population."8 ATS accepted applications from the general public without
restriction.' Because the applicant pool was larger than the number of
available positions, ATS offered admission to applicants based on a lottery.' °
Applicants who were the siblings of older students already attending ATS
were offered admission before any other applicants." When Tuttle and
Sechler (the "Applicants") applied to ATS in 1998, there were 23 ATS siblingapplicants, leaving 46 positions available.' 2 There were 162 non-sibling
applicants that year and the school used a weighted random lottery to
determine the remaining 46 offers for admission. 3 ATS weighed each
applicant's lottery number so that applicants from under-represented groups,
4
as defined by the policy, had an increased probability of selection.
Tuttle and Sechler did not have siblings attending ATS and they did not
have an increased probability of selection based on their diversity factor
classifications." Ultimately, they were not selected for admission through the
lottery process.' 6 The Applicants filed for an injunction in district court
against the School Board to stop ATS' admission process. 7 The district court
ruled that as a matter of law, "diversity was not a compelling governmental
interest" because the only compelling governmental interest to justify racial
classifications was "to remedy the effects of past discrimination." i" The
district court ordered that the Applicants were entitled to permanent injunctive
relief.'9 The School Board appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit. 0 The Circuit Court addressed three issues on appeal. 2
First, the applicants argued that the School Board was collaterally estopped
from disputing the district court's conclusion of law that diversity was not a
8. Id
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 702.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 703. (quoting Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22578, No. CA98-418-A, at 8 (E.D. Va. April 14, 1998).)
19. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 702, 703.
20. Id. at 703. For purposes of this case note, only the second issue will be addressed. As to the first
issue, the School Board was not collaterally estopped from disputing the district court's ruling because the
policy in Tito was considerably different than the current Policy. Id.at 704. For collateral estoppel to apply,
the proponent must establish that the issue to be precluded is identical to the one previously litigated. Id
at 703. On the third issue, the Court ruled that although the Applicants were entitled to an injunction, they
were not entitled to a permanent injunction ordering the School Board to adopt a particular admissions
policy. Id. at 708. An injunction should be tailored to restrain no more than what is reasonably required
to accomplish its ends, and a permanent injunction would go beyond the extent of the established violation.
21. Id at 703.
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compelling state interest because it never appealed the issue in Tito v.
Arlington County School Bd.22 Second, the School Board contended that the
policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.23 Finally, the School Board claimed that the permanent
injunction was overbroad.24
HOLDING
The Court held that the Weighted lottery violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2" The Court assumed that diversity may
be a compelling interest and found that the policy was not narrowly tailored
to pass constitutional muster. 26 The Court vacated the permanent injunction
and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to give the Arlington Traditional
School an opportunity to provide an alternative policy.27
ANALYSIS
The main issue that the Fourth Circuit addressed was whether the policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28
Although race or ethnicity is only one of the policy's diversity factors, it is
undisputed that the policy involves a racial classification analysis. 29 All racial
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.3" Under strict scrutiny, a racial
classification must (1) serve a compelling governmental interest and (2) be
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.3
Diversity may be a compelling governmental interest. 2 The only
applicable Supreme Court precedent is Justice Powell's concurrence in
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke,3 3 where Justice Powell wrote that
22. Id. See, Tito v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7932.
23. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 703.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 701.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 704.
29. Id.
30. Id See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
31. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 704.
32. Id. The only circuit to hold that diversity is not a compelling interest is the Fifth Circuit. In
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit held that the only compelling interest
tojustify racial classifications was remedying past discrimination. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 704. The First Circuit
is the only court of appeals to have addressed the issue of diversity as a compelling state interest in the
context before this court -- the use of race-based classifications in an admissions policy in a public
elementary school. In Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1998), the court assumed, without
deciding, that diversity may be a compelling governmental interest. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 704.
33. 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).
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diversity "furthers a compelling state interest. 34 This Court interpreted Bakke
as holding that a state is not absolutely barred from giving any consideration
to race in a nonremedial context. 35 Because the Supreme Court has not
provided decisive guidance, this Court assumed, without holding, that
diversity may be a compelling governmental interest and proceeded to the
second prong of the strict scrutiny analysis -- whether the policy was narrowly
tailored to achieve that diversity. 6
In reviewing whether the state racial classification was narrowly tailored,
five factors were considered: (1) the efficacy of race-neutral policies, (2) the
planned duration of the policy, (3) the relationship between the numerical goal
and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population, (4)
the flexibility of the policy, and (5) the burden of the policy on innocent third
parties.37
The Court first considered whether there were alternative race-neutral
policies to promote diversity.38 It found that the School Board's own
Alternative Schools Admission Study Committee had offered one or more
alternative race-neutral policies in its Report to the Superintendent.39 While the
Committee eventually recommended the current policy, the fact the Committee
also proposed other alternatives demonstrated that the School Board had raceneutral means to promote diversity.4"
Second, the Court considered the planned duration of the policy. 4' The
policy stated that the weighted lottery would be conducted "for the 1999-2000
school year and thereafter.' ' 2 Because a racial classification cannot continue
in perpetuity but must have a "logical stopping point," the policy was not
narrowly tailored.43
Third, the policy sought to achieve racial diversity in its classes in
"proportions that approximate the distribution of students from racial groups
in the district's overall student population."
The policy employed racial
balancing to achieve this diversity.4 5 The Court concluded that although the

34.
35.
36.
37.

Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,313 (1978).)
Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705.
Id.
Id.at 706; Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 216 (4th Cir.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.(citing City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989).)
Id.at 707. Racial balancing considers the relationship between the school's numerical goal for

1993).

student diversity and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population.
45. Id.
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policy did not explicitly set aside spots solely for certain minorities, it had
practically the same result by skewing the odds of selection in favor of certain
minorities.46 Even if the final results had some statistical variation, racial
balancing and the policy's primary goals of providing students with the
educational benefits of diversity and of better serving the diverse groups of
students in its district, drove the weighted lottery process.47
Fourth, the Court did not find the policy to be sufficiently flexible. 48 ATS
argued that the policy was flexible because instead of relying on a set
numerical goal, it relied on the results of the random lottery determined
admission. 49 The Court disagreed.50 Since ATS admissions were based on
availability, if the applicant pool did not reflect the required racial and ethnic
diversity percentage based on the school's three diversity factors, each child's
probability of selection in the lottery was adjusted corresponding to his or her
race.5 The policy, like the Davis admissions program in Bakke, did not treat
applicants as individuals.52 The race/ethnicity factor granted preferential
treatment to certain applicants because of their race.5 3 Hence, flexibility is lost
because the policy is increasing admissions probabilities for certain minorities,
which is similar to the effect of setting aside spots solely for minorities.54
Fifth, the program placed a great burden on innocent third parties." The
innocent third parties in the case were kindergarten children who did not meet
any of the policy's diversity criteria.56 The Court found it ironic that a policy
that sought to teach children to view people as individuals rather than members
of certain racial groups classified those same children as members of certain
racial groups. On balance, the Court concluded that the policy was not
narrowly tailored to further diversity, and thus, found it unconstitutional. As
a result of the insufficiently tailored policy, the question of whether diversity
is a compelling interest was left unanswered.5"

46. Id.
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. Id.

50. Id.
51.

Id.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 705.
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CONCLUSION
This case reinforces the view of the strict scrutiny standard as strict in
theory and fatal in fact. Although the Supreme Court has declared that race
is a suspect classification that requires the strict scrutiny standard of review,
it has not declared that diversity-promoting policies by state actors are per se
unconstitutional. As evidenced by this case, however, a party attempting to
uphold a race-based policy will have to face an enormous challenge in passing
the two-prongs of the strict scrutiny test.
First, the policy must serve a compelling state interest. The Supreme
Court has yet to determine whether promoting racial and ethnic diversity is a
compelling interest. The Supreme Court has only ruled that race-based
discrimination is constitutional in a remedial context. Though the promotion
of diversity as a legitimate interest has not been ruled upon, it is certainly an
issue that the Supreme Court will address in the near future. If diversity is not
found to be a compelling state or governmental interest, however, state actors
will have to provide alternative reasoning for implementing race-based
policies. From a practical point of view, it is difficult to conceive of another
reason that could be more compelling than promoting diversity that would
pass constitutional muster.
Second, the policy used must be narrowly tailored to pass the second
prong. From this ruling, one can learn that to be narrowly tailored, there must
be a logical stopping point to the policy's application. There must be a
showing that other race-neutral policies were not available and that the state's
objective required racial balancing if the policy does in fact entail racial
balancing. Applicants must also be evaluated as individuals and not simply
as members of groups. Finally, the court will consider the burden on innocent
third parties and balance the burden with the need to promote the state's
objectives.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Rhea Tziros

